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Eyewitnesses of the Fourth Crusade - the 
War against Alexius In 
Peter Noble 
University of Reading 
There are three eyewitness accounts of the Fourth Crusade which cover 
some of the same events from different perspectives, and all of which 
were written within a few years of the events described. l Geoffroi de 
ViUehardouin was a prominent member of the Fourth Crusade and 
probably an experienced crusader. He was clearly deeply involved in 
most of the councils, in the negotiations between the crusaders and the 
Venetians as well as the negotiations between the crusaders and the 
Greeks. He was privy to many, if not all, the decisions taken by the 
crusade' s leaders. His account is therefore based on first-hand 
information, and he seems to have had access to at least some of the 
official documents when dictating his narrative.2 He composed it 
almost certainly after the death of Boniface de Montferrat in 1207 and 
probably before Henri de Valenciennes began his account of the 
campaigns of the Emperor Henri in late 1208.3 Robert de Clari was a 
peUy knight from Picardy, a follower of Pierre d' Arniens, whose 
account reveals the gulf between the leaders and the ordinary crusaders. 
His naive amazement at the marvels of Constantinople shows the 
relati ve lack of sophistication of the majority of the Westemers 
participating in the Crusade, who were amazed by the size and 
splendour of the city as Villehardouin confIrms (CCC LXXXII-XCII; 
CCV 128). He gives an insight into the issues that occupied the rank 
and me and the misapprehensions and rumours that circulated amongst 
them. His account is more difflcult to date than the other two as it 
could have been written either after 1216, the date of the death of the 
Emperor Heuri which he mentions, or in 1205 soon after his retum 
home, with an epilogue covering in a very brief fashion the events up 
to 1216 when he heard of the death of Henri. Given the detail of the 
account, it seems probable that the earlier date is the more likely' 
Nicetas Choniates was a high-ranking Greek civil servant, educated in 
the classical tradition and a helpless spectator of the fall of the 
Constantinople, which he saw as a punishment for the faults of its 
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inhabitants and in particular its leaders.s His history, most of which 
was written in the reign of Alexius III, continues up to 1206-7 and is 
probably the closest in time to the actual events discussed here.6 
The diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople was agreed 
after the attack on Zara, and Villehardouin's account makes it clear that 
the decision was in effect a coup by the leaders, such as the Marquis of 
Montferrat and the Counts of Flanders, Blois and 5t Pol who 
announced that they would be shamed if they did not accept the offer of 
the exiled Greek Prince, Alexius, son of the deposed Emperor Isaac 
(CCV 98). He makes no mention of any part played in this 
announcement by the Doge of Venice which is surprising, given the 
prominent role usually taken in the councils of the crusaders by the 
Doge. According to Clari, who was not, of course, party to the 
decision because of his relatively lowly rank, it was the Doge who 
persuaded the crusaders to accept the offer of Prince Alexius (CCC 
XXXIX). Nicetas depicts the young man as the pawn of the Venetians 
who were plotting the downfall of his uncle to avenge their injuries7 
The leading role of the Venetians is thus confIrmed by two of the three 
texts. Although this plot was apparently common knowledge in 
Constantinople, Alexius III had made no effort to prepare for a 
possible attack (OCB 296). Villehardouin's silence on the role of the 
Doge is signifIcant, all the more so in view of the comments by Clari 
and Nicetas. It seems inconceivable that a personality as forceful as the 
Doge did not take a prominent part in the decision, but Villehardouin 
prefers to present the decision as one taken for reasons of feudal 
honour and justice.8 The barons agree to restore Prince Alexius to the 
lands which are rightfully his, and in return he will support the army 
with men and money. This theme of feudal justice is one which 
ViUehardouin will continue to use in his presentation of the diversion 
to Constantinople and is no doubt designed to appeal to his most 
likely audience, the nobles of northern France and Flanders. 
Clari makes the point that the diversion was sanctioned by the 
Bishops who approved the justice of the cause, the restoration of the 
rightful heir (CCC XXXIX). ViUehardouin is most revealing here on 
the disagreements between the churchmen who were accompanying the 
crusade as he describes the arguments between the Abbot of Vaux and 
the Abbot of Loos, commenting that it was no wonder that the 
laymen were divided when the clerics were at loggerheads amongst 
themselves (CCV 97). For Clari, however, once the Bishops had 
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sanctified the expedition, the intervening events seem to have heen of 
little interest. He tells us nothing about any of the incidents which 
happened between Zara and Constantinople. NicelaS, less surprisingly, 
also has little to say on this period, but he comments that only after 
the proclamation of Prince Alexius as emperor at Epidamnos 
(Durazzo) did A1exius IJJ wake up to the threat. During the previous 
months he had made no attempt to stockpile weapons or repair the 
warships which had been allowed to rot in the harbour because of 
apathy and embezzlement. Belatedly he started to repair the twenty or 
so vessels still available and to pull down the houses nearest to the 
city walls (OCB 296·7). 
Villehardouin, however, treats the voyage from Zara to 
Constantinople as an episode of considerable importance. Not only 
does he treat briefly the episode at Durazzo where the townspeople 
swore allegiance to Prince A1exius, but he describes very fully the 
dissension within the army at Corfu where many were ready to 
abandon the army to go directly to the Holy Land (CCV 111·118). 
Only the personal appeal of Boniface and other leaders persuaded them 
to stay. They imposed strict conditions on the leaders, however, which 
were not subsequently adhered to. It is noticeable that some very 
important people participated in this revol~ Jacques d' Avesnes, Guy de 
Coucy, Pierre d' Amiens etc., some of whom later played leading roles 
in the conquest of Greece9 Their departure would have seriously 
weakened the crusade, and it is no wonder that the leaders were prepared 
to accept almost any terms to keep them. All three chroniclers agree 
that the voyage to Constantinople was swift and easy, but only 
Villehardouin mentions the attack on Andros by part of the fleet led by 
Boniface and Baldwin who extorted considerable sums from the 
inhabitants in return for peace (CCV 123).10 
The Western chroniclers agree on the wonderful sight that 
Constantinople presented, but Nicetas remarks that the Greeks showed 
little interest in the arrival of the fleet. The opposition to the landing 
at Chalcedon was completely ineffective, and the nearest Greek troops 
fled when challenged. His account of this episode is confirmed by 
Villehardouin. The embassy of Nicolas Roux to Boniface in which 
A1exius IJJ offered generous terms mingled with threats if the crusaders 
did not accept them is mentioned only by Villehardouin. The sarcastic 
speech of refusal attributed to Conon de Bethune picks up the theme of 
feudal rights which Villehardouin had used earlier in connection with 
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the claims of Prince Alexius (CCVI44). Clari would not have been 
involved in the negotiations and gives no details, althougb he does 
refer to an offer of silver and gold from A1exius III (CCC XL!).! 1 
Nicetas knows nothing of the debates within the crusader camp and 
does not mention the attempt by the crusaders to rouse the citizens 
against A1exius III by parading the young prince past the walls of the 
city, a suggestion of the Doge according to Clari (CCC XLI). The 
description in Villehardouin continues the theme of feudal justice as 
the crusaders call on the Greeks to return to their rightful allegiance, 
an appeal to which, he says, the Greeks were too frigbtened to 
respond. Clari, on the other hand, reports that the Greeks shouted back 
that they knew nothing of the young man and did not recognise him, 
an explanation which seems rather more convincing (CCC XLI). 
Nicetas, who has the unenviable task of explaining the defeat of his 
fellowcountrymen, sees the failure of the Greeks to counter-attack as a 
prime cause in encouraging the Latins to press borne their attack 
(OCB 297). Clari has nothing to say on the councils which preceded 
the first attack, and the order of events in his narrative and that of 
Villehardouin reflects the difference in their positions in the army. 
Villebardouin reports the agreement on the order of battle which 
corresponds pretty much to that of Clari who does not, however, give 
his order of battle until the actual battle several days later, as he would 
not have been party to the discussions, which were probably not very 
amicable (CCV 147-53, CCC XLV). Unlike Villehardouin, Clari 
comments on the atmosphere of fear in the army when the attack on 
the shore is mooted (CCC XLI). 
The capture of the tower of Galata is treated very differently by the 
three writers. NicetaS, as a non-combattant, notes the brevity and 
inefficacity of the Greek resistance, which resulted in the loss of the 
tower and the whole of the harbour and the north shore of the Golden 
Hom, whose defenders offered some brief resistance at the bridge across 
the harbour before fleeing across it and breaking it down behind them 
(OCB 297). Both Villehardouin and Clari indicate the religious nature 
of the expedition by mentioning the role of the bishops who insisted 
that the crusaders make wills and go to confession before the battle 
(CCVI54, CCC XLI)12 After that, bowever, they differ on the 
details. Clari comments on the role of the crossbowmen wbo clear the 
sbore for the knigbts to ride out mounted in full armour from the 
ships. Villebardouin does not mention the crossbowrnen and is quite 
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clear that the knights jumped fully armed into the water and waded 
ashore at which point they lowered their lances, whereupon the Greeks 
fled. Only then were the horses brought out from the ships. Neither 
chronicler was writing at the time of the events described, but it is 
always possible that both were correct as they could have been 
describing different sections of the attack. Clari' s description of the 
capture of the Tower of Galata and the harbour is brief, whereas 
Villehardouin is much fuller, making it clear that the Tower was 
captured the day after the landing and after fierce resistance by the 
defenders, whose sortie from the Tower backftred (CCV 160). Possibly 
he is magnifying the Greek resistance to make the victory seem more 
impressive, as Nicetas was not impressed by the defence offered by the 
Greeks.13 Villehardouin's account of an aggressive tactic which went 
wrong is very convincing. The Latins pursued the retreating Greeks so 
closely that they were unable to dose the doors to prevent the entry of 
the Latins who captured the Tower with considerable slaughter. The 
boost to the morale of the crusaders was considerable and was matched 
by the depression felt by the people of Constantinople. The following 
day the chain acros the harbour mouth was broken and the harbour 
captured and cleared of any Greek ships. 
Both men agree that the battle plan was for the Venetians to attack 
by sea and the crusaders by land, but they disagree on what happened at 
the bridge where Villehardouin says that the crusaders were amazed at 
the lack of resistance, while Clari says that the Greeks did attempt to 
defend the bridge but were driven back. NicelaS conftrms that there was 
some fighting at the bridge (CCV 163, CCC XLIV, OCB 297)14 
The scale of the undertaking is made clear by Villehardouin's comment 
that the army was big enough to lay siege to only one of the city's 
gates, but the lack of leadership and the low morale on the Greek side 
were clearly crucial . Nicetas suggests that A1exius III had already 
decided on flight when the crusaders set up camp opposite the Palace 
of Blachemae, before any serious fighting had taken place (OCB 298). 
The Emperor offered no resistance and did not take up arms, although 
his friends and kinsmen did make sorties to harry the crusaders, which 
is conftrmed by Villehardouin who paints a picture of an army under 
constant attack. Clari mentions none of this, although Nicetas says 
'our deeds were nOl ignoble'. (p.298 [544])15 He also mentions 
infantry attacks on the crusaders. Villehardouin, however, says that the 
Greeks suffered heavy losses in these skirmishes and, as events of 
80 Peter Noble 
particular significance, mentions the capture of Constantine Lascaris 
by the BurgundianS and the prowess of PIerre de Bracheux whose 
quarters were nearest the gate and who was therefore involved in most 
of the skirmishes (CCV 167-9)16 
It took the crusaders ten days to prepare their all-out attack. 
Nicetas says that they had decided to try an attack and, if that failed, to 
negotiate. He describes the attack from the land with the battering ram 
and the crossbowmen in the van. The heavy-armed troops with the ram 
broke through the wall into the city where they met fierce resistance 
from the Pisans, who were the enemies of the Venetians, and the 'ax-
bearing barbarians' (OCB 298), presumably the Varangian Guards. 
There is no mention of Greeks, but the Latins were driven back with 
many wounded. On the sea front, however, where the Venetians were 
higher than the walls so that they could fife down on them, they were 
easily able to drive the defenders back and occupy part of the walls, 
after which they set fife to part of the city. According to Nicetas the 
fire destroyed the whole quarter from the hill of Blachernae to the 
Deuteron quarter (OCB 298). ViJlehardouin's account is very close to 
that of NicelaS. He too mentions that English and Danish mercenaries 
manned the walls under attack by the crusaders and that the Greek 
forces succeeded in driving the attackers back. He does not, however, 
mention the Pisans (CCV 171). The initial Venetian attacks were also 
unsuccessful but the leadership of the Doge was such that his men 
followed him ashore, and there followed the reported miracle when the 
banner of St Mark was seen to fly from one of the defensive towers, 
although no-one knew how it had got there. 
173. Or porroiz air estrange proesce; que Ii dux de Venise, qui 
vialz hom ere et gate ne veoit, fu toz armez, el chief de la soe 
galie, el aIle gonfanon Saint Marc pardevant lui; et escrioit as 
suens que il Ii meissent a terre, au se ce non il feroit jutise de 
lor cars. Et il si firent; que la galie prenl terre, et il saiUenl 
fors; si portenlle confanon Saint Marc parde van I lui a la terre. 
174. Et quant Ii Venisien voient Ie confanon Saint Marc a la 
terre, et la galie lor seignor qui at terre prise devant als, si se 
tint chascuns a honi, el vont a la terre tuil; et cil des uissiers 
saiUent fors et vont a la terre, et cil des granz nes entrent es 
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barges et vont lila terre, qui ainz ainz, qui mielz mielz. Lors 
velssiez assaut grant et merveillox; et ce tesmoigne J offrois de 
Vile-Harduin Ii mareschaus de Champaigne, qui ceste ovre 
traita, que plus de quarante Ii dis trent por verite que il virent Ie 
confanon Saint Marc de Venise en une des tors, et mie ne 
sorent qui I'i porta. 
According to him the Venetians captured twenty-five towers but for 
once Alexius reacted promptly and sent large forces against them, so 
that it was impossible for them to withstand the Greek counter-attack. 
They therefore started the fire as a defensive measure to cover their 
withdrawal. 
All three chroniclers agree that at this point Alexius III finally 
mobilised his forces and led his army out against the crusaders. Nicetas 
describes him as moved by the plight of the city, while the mob 
wbich had been infuriated by bis lack of forethought insulted bim, 
angered by the fact that for the first time the enemy was attacking the 
walls of the city. Alexius must have been only too well aware of the 
power of the city mob when roused and realised that his position was 
endangered by both external and internal threats. Nicetas detected alarm 
amongst the Latins at the size of the Greek army wbich, according to 
bim, contained the flower of their troops and which, with proper 
leadership, could bave routed the enemy. Certainly the accounts of the 
crusaders confum that they were very aware of the seriousness of the 
danger in wbicb they were. The cowardice of Alexius' s advisors meant 
that the army withdrew pursued by the triumphant Latins, and the 
position was irnrneasureably worsened.17 Villehardouin confums most 
of the account of Nicelas with extra details available to a participant. 
The two armies in fact faced each other within shooting distance. The 
Latins were drawn up with their backs to the palisade which defended 
their camp so that they could not be attacked from the rear and refused 
to advance towards the Greeks as otherwise their small forces would 
have been drowned in the sea of men opposing them. Villehardouin's 
estimate is that they had six divisions opposing at least forty," all 
bigger than the crusading divisions, which may simply mean an 
overwhelming force (CCV 179). The position was so desperate that 
when the Doge heard of it, he ordered the Venetians to abandon their 
conquered towers and sail to the aid of the Latins. To the pious 
Villebardouin the retreat of the Greeks could only be due to God's 
82 Peter Noble 
will, reinforcing yet another theme of his narrative - that the crusade 
could have been successful only because God wished it to be so, when 
the odds against it were so overwhelming. 
Et sachiez que onques Diex ne traist de plus grant peril nule 
gent con il fist cels de l'ost cel jor; et sachiez qu'i! n'i ot si 
bardi qui n'atist grantjoie. (CCV 181) 
The retreat of the Greeks allowed the weary crusaders to return to the 
camp, take off their armour and eat and drink what they could find, for 
the supplies were running very short. It would have been the ideal 
opportunity for a Greek counter-attack had there been a commander of 
vision and energy on their side. 
Clari devotes much more space to this episode, almost certainly 
because he was in the squadron <if Pierre d' Amiens and thus for once 
right in the thick of the action. He omits all the fighting before the 
advance of Alexius III against the crusaders, although he describes the 
preparations and confirms the description of the ships given by 
Nicetas. His battle order is almost the same as that of Villehardouin, 
although he has the squadrons in a different order and adds that the 
cooks and grooms were armed as well who struck terror in the Greeks 
because of their fearsome appearance. 
et les garchons et les quisiniers mist on par devers Ie cite, 
encontre les gens a pie l' empereur qui estoient rengie contreval 
les murs. Quant Ie pietaille l' empereur virent no menu gent si 
laidement armee, si en eurent si grand peur et si grant hisde que 
onques ne s'oserent mouvoir, De venir vers aus, ne onques de 
chele part n' eut l' os warde. (CCC XLV) 
He gives a much fuller account than Villehardouin of the manoeuvring 
of the armies as three squadrons of crusaders advance to attack the 
Emperor, but the advisors of Baldwin who was leading felt that it was 
dangerous to attack so far from the camp and wanted him to tum back. 
The Count of St Pol and Pierre d' Amiens did not want to tum their 
squadron in second place back, however, and continued the advance, 
which, Baldwin feared, would shame him. He therefore continued the 
advance, as otherwise his knights threatened to renounce their 
allegiance to him (CCC XL VIII). Clari mentions here that the ladies 
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of Constantinople who were watching from the walls thought that the 
Franks were as beautiful as angels in their armour. How he knows this 
is unclear. 19 Both sides advanced with their crosshowmen ftring, and 
between them was a small rise in the ground which they had to climb. 
The Franks reached the top fIrSt and hailed, afraid to advance further as 
they would then be out of sight of their camp. Before they had taken 
any decision, however, the Emperor withdrew his forces into the city 
without any further attempt to ftght. Neither Clari nor Villehardouin 
mention any attempt by the Franks to pursue the Greeks in the way 
described by Nicetas 2 0 Like Villehardouin Clari says that the army 
went back to the camp to disarm and engage in mutual congratulation 
with the Venetians. The uproar in the city was so great, however, that 
it could be heard in the camp as the Emperor was warned that either he 
fought against the Franks or the people would tum to Prince Alexius 
to make him emperor. 
All the chroniclers agree that that night Alexius III fled from 
Constantinople. Clari says that he took as many people with him as 
he could (CCC LJ). ViJlehardouin, no doubt bener informed, mentions 
that he took all the money and valuables with him that he could (CCV 
182). Nicetas, even better informed, claims that his flight hastened the 
destruction of the city. Alexius III fled with his daughter, Irene, his 
gold and his gems, thinking only of himself. From the moment that 
he returned to the city, he had thought only of his flight and self-
preservation. He thought of neither his wife nor his children nor the 
city (OCB 299). Summing him up Nicetas has nothing to add to his 
description of him in warfare. He is critical of him as an administrator 
though not very harshly. He had his good points - mild, accessible, 
avoiding slanderers and flatterers. He was neither cruel nor rude, but he 
was womanish and fled though driven away by no-one. It was the 
misfortune of the Byzantines to be ruled by effete and dissolute 
emperors (OCB 299-300). 
Thus Nicetas makes it clear more by implication than direct 
statement that Alexius III was the principal author of his own 
downfall, although he also blames the cowardice of his advisors. His 
failure to prepare for the arrival of the crusaders which he was well 
warned to expect compounded the years of neglect and corruption 
which had reduced the once proud fleet to a useless remnant.2l Once 
the Frankish army had arrived, the total failure of A1exius to offer any 
form of leadership raised the morale of the invaders and dispirited his 
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own people. Without even any anempt to offer serious resistance 
Alexius abandoned the city, his throne and part of his family to seek 
safety elsewhere. It is clear from the accounts of both Clari and 
Villebardouin that any serious counter-attack by the Greeks could have 
caused the crusaders serious problems. There was no attempt to use 
their overwhelming numbers. There was no attempt to blockade the 
camps and prevent the crusaders from getting food or water, which 
Villehardouin admits were in extremely short supply (CCV 165). The 
resistance to the landings of the crusaders when they were at their most 
vulnerable was feeble in the extreme according to Nicetas. For Nicetas 
this is all part of his vision of the fate of Byzantium as the fitting 
punishment for the City of God which no longer deserved its position. 
His attitude is almost fatalistic to the fall of the city which has 
brought its destruction on itself and is deservedly punished.22 
Villehardouin also sees the fall of Constantinople as a part of God's 
scheme of things. The success of the crusaders proves that they are 
carrying out God's will, punishing the schismatic and deceitful Greeks 
who have rejected their true ruler and accepted a usurper.23 The 
overwhelming odds which the crusaders fared are a further proof of the 
intervention of God on the side of the crusaders. A close comparison 
of Villehardouin's account with that of Nicetas shows the accuracy of 
his description of events, but a comparison of his account with that of 
Clari also reveals how closely Villehardouin is linked to the Doge and 
the Venetians. Their role in the successful attacks on the city is 
described only in his account." Clari is also not without his 
favourites. The tactical manoe~vres against Alexius's army show a 
clear interest in giving full credit to the squadron of the Count of St 
Pol and Pierre d' Amiens, which is absent from the account of 
Villehardouin. Tbis can, of course, be explained, by the fact that 
Villehardouin was in a different squadron in a different part of the 
banlefield, but it is nonetheless significant that Clari shows very 
clearly how competitive and in a way disorganised the crusaders were. 
Each squadron was jealous of its position. The squadrons were 
operating independently and only cooperating when it suited them. 
Feudal honour and personal interest were as important to those 
participating as the common interest. A determined attack at a moment 
of sucb confusion could bave wreaked havoc as the crusaders bestitated 
and cbanged tack before finally deciding to stick to the Original plan. 
The total failure of the Greeks to exploit any such opportunities 
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reflects very poorly on their leadersbip and their military awareness. 
Cavalry squadrons are at their most vulnerable wben manoeuvring or 
wben orders are cbanged. The complete failure of the leading crusaders 
to coordinate their movements must bave meant that there were men 
and borses milling about uncertain of the next move and probably out 
of formation. An experienced or daring commander could bave seized 
the initiative from the crusaders, but there was no-one on the Greek 
side to give a lead. 
Tbe three accounts are both complementary and, by and large, 
consistent. Tbe details vary as is inevitable, since the rank and 
nationality of the men are different and their access to information was 
very different. They were all writing after the events described althougb 
not very long after, at most ten or eleven years if the later date for 
CIari is accepted. Between the three of them it is possible to construct 
a reasonably complete picture of the course of this episode in the 
crusade. All three sbow the total collapse of leadersbip on the Greek 
side. Alexius III defeated bimself. Had be sbown any courage or 
tactical sense, be could bave probably overwbelmed the crusaders. 
Instead be cbose fligbt wben the war was far from lost. His inadequacy 
as a ruler and a leader was cruelly sbown by bis response or more 
accurately lack of response to the crusade. The chroniclers also show 
the lack of organisation and unity on the crusading side. Faced with 
overwhelming odds and in an extremely dangerous situation the 
crusaders were still capable of jeopardising their cause. Their total 
failure to understand their enemy is shown by their attempt to win 
over the Greeks to Prince Alexius by appeals to their sense of feudal 
bonour, a concept completely alien to tbe Greeks 25 It was an 
important justification for the war in the eyes of at least some of the 
Latins, bowever, wbicb with the backing of the cburchmen on the 
crusade made it possible for them to argue that the war was morally 
defensible. Tbe difficulty of their situation is sbown by the sbortage of 
food and water wbicb they constantly faced. Tbey were all the time 
within abair's breadth of defeat and they must bave known it; bence 
their faith in and their gratitude to God for rescuing them from wbat 
seemed like impossible positions. Their own courage and figbting 
skill, tbe quality of their leadersbip on tbe battlefield and their 
motivation must also be taken into account. From the accounts of the 
three chroniclers it is possible to appreciate to some extent the reasons 
for the conflict as they appeared to the participants and to see bow a 
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sophisticated society weakened by corruption and incompetence feU 
hefore the attack of a younger, barder society inspired by dislike of the 
Greeks and an arrogant sense of its own superiority. 
NOTES 
1 A version of this paper was given at the 1999 Jerusalem Conference for 
the Society for tbe History of the Crusades and tbe Latin East where it was 
read for me by Dr Karen Pratt, whom I would like to thank for her kindness. 
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Geoffroy de Villcbardouin, La Conquete de Constantinople, ed. Jean 
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paragrapb number in Arabic); Nicetas Choniales, 0 City of Byzantium, 
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2 Villebardouin, La Conquele de Constantinople, ed. E Faral, 2 vols., 
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